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for ethical conflict resolution
Hiroyuki Tamura
Abstract — In this paper we try to construct a two-attribute
group disutility function for two conflicting decision mak-
ers, taking into account the property of utility independence
and/or convex dependence between them. Two variables in the
group utility function are disutility levels of two conflicting de-
cision makers. The disutility level of each decision maker is
modeled using multiple attributes, that is disutility function of
each decision maker is formulated as a multi-attribute disu-
tility function. By using a group disutility function for two
conflicting agents, we can model the mutual concessions of the
two conflicting agents taking into account ethical preference of
each decision maker, and hence we can expect fairer multiple
agents decision making for realizing better social welfare.
Keywords — utility theory, conflict resolution, multi-agent de-
cision making, ethical consideration, convex dependence.
1. Introduction
In planning a large public project it is quite important to ob-
tain a consensus between two conflicting decision makers,
a representative of the regional inhabitants and of the en-
terpriser, to create a pleasant and useful environment. This
paper deals with a methodology of modeling decision anal-
ysis for consensus formation between two conflicting mul-
tiple agents, regional inhabitants and the enterpriser (devel-
oper) of a big public project such as constructing a large
international airport, a freeway with heavy traffic, a refuse
incineration plant, etc. For this purpose we try to con-
struct a group disutility function for two conflicting agents,
taking into account the utility independence [1, 1993] or
convex dependence [2] between them. This is called the
“multi-agent utility theory”. By using such a group disu-
tility function for two conflicting agents, we can model the
mutual concessions of the two conflicting agents taking into
account ethical preference [3] with each other, and hence
we can expect fairer MADA (multiple agents decision mak-
ing) for realizing better social welfare.
2. A group disutility functions
for multi-agent decision making
Let D1 D2 be a two-attribute disutility function space
and d1(x1) 2 D1, d2(x2) 2 D2 denote the disutility func-
tions of decision maker DM1 and DM2 on the multi-
attribute consequence spaces X1 and X2, respectively,
where xi 2 Xi (i = 1; 2) denotes a specific consequence
for DMi.
For a given d1(x1)2D1, and d2(x2)2D2, a group disutility
function on D1D2 space is defined as
G(x1; x2) = g
 
d1(x1); d2(x2)

 g(d1; d2) :
Let us assume that d01 and d02 denote the worst levels of
disutilities of DM1 and DM2, respectively, and d1 and d2
denote the best levels of disutilities of DM1 and DM2, re-
spectively. Given an arbitrary d2 2D2, a normalized condi-
tional group disutility function (NCGDF) of DM1 is defined
as
g1(d1 j d2)
g(d1; d2) g(d1; d2)
g(d01 ; d2) g(d1; d2)
;
where it is assumed that
g(d01 ; d2)> g(d

1 ; d2) :
It is obvious that
g1(d
0
1 j d2) = 1; g1(d

1 j d2) = 0
that is, NCGDF is normalized and is a single-attribute
group disutility function. Hence it is easily identified.
The NCGDF for DM2, that is, g2(d2 j d1) can also be de-
fined similarly as
g2(d2 j d1)
g(d1; d2) g(d1; d2)
g(d1; d02) g(d1; d2)
:
The NCGDF g1(d1 j d2) represents DM1’s and g2(d2 j d1)
represents DM2’s subjective preference for the group disu-
tility as a function of his own disutility level, under the
condition that the disutility level of the other DM is given.
If NCGDF g1(d1 j d2) does not depend on the conditional
level d2, then attribute D1 is utility independent [1, 1993]
on attribute D2. If attributes D1 and D2 are mutually utility
independent, the two-attribute disutility function g(d1; d2)
can be described as either a multiplicative or additive
from [1, 1993].
Suppose
g1(d1 j d2) 6= g1(d1 j d

2)
for some
d2 2 D2
that is, utility independence does not hold between two
attributes D1 and D2. In this case we can use a property
of convex dependence [2] as a natural extension of utility
independence.
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The property of convex dependence is defined as fol-
lows: attribute D1 is mth order convex dependent on at-
tribute D2, denoted D1(CDm)D2, if there exist distinct
d02 ; d12 ; : : : ; dm2 2 D2 and real functions l 0; l 1; : : : ; l m on
D2 such that NCGDF g1(d1 j d2) can be written as
g1(d1 j d2) =
m
å
i=0
l i(d2)g1(d1 j d
i
2) ;
where
m
å
i=0
l i(d2) = 1
for all d1 2 D1 and d2 2 D2 where m is the smallest non-
negative integer for which this relation holds.
This definition says that, if D1(CDm)D2, then any NCGDF
on D1 can be described as a convex combination of (m+1)
NCGDFs with different conditional levels where l i(d2)s
are not necessarily non-negative. Especially, when m = 0
and D1(CD0)D2, attribute D1 is utility independent on
attribute D2.
The algorithm for constructing a two-attribute group disu-
tility function is as follows:
Step 1. NCGDFs g1(d1 j d02), g1(d1 j d2) and g1(d1 j d0:52 )
are assessed, where d0:52 denotes the intermediate level of
attribute D2 between the worst level d02 and the best level d2 .
Step 2. If these NCGDFs are almost identical, D1(CD0)D2
holds. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3. If the convex combination of g1 (d1 j d02) and
g1 (d1 j d 2 ) is almost identical with g1 (d1 j d 0:52 ),
D1(CD1)D2 holds. Otherwise, higher order convex depen-
dence holds. Once the order of convex dependence is found,
the decomposition form [2] two-attribute disutility function
can be obtained. Single-attribute NCGDFs play a role of
basic elements in the two-attribute group disutility function.
Step 4. By assessing the corner values of a group disu-
tility function in two-attribute space, coefficients of linear
terms in the two-attribute group disutility function are ob-
tained [4]. As a result a two-attribute group disutility func-
tion is obtained.
In modeling multi-agent decision making with conflicting
DMs, NCGDF plays the most important role as it can model
various patterns of a DM’s preference who is self-centered
and selfish or flexible and cooperative, and so forth.
3. Consensus formation modeling
for multi-agent decision making
Let DM1 and DM2 be
– DM1: representative of the regional inhabitants;
– DM2: representative of the enterpriser who is plan-
ning a new public project.
Suppose the disutility function d1 for DM1 evaluates envi-
ronmental impact from the public project and the disutil-
ity function d2 for DM2 evaluates the cost to realize vari-
ous countermeasures of the public project. These disutility
functions are constructed by questioning the environmental
specialists about each situation of DM1 and DM2.
We construct the NCGDFs by again questioning the
environmental specialists about each situation of DM1
and DM2. Consequently, suppose we obtained three types
of models as follows:
Model 1. Mutual utility independence holds. Both DM1
and DM2 do not think that group disutility is small unless
their own disutility is also small. In this case both DM1
and DM2 are selfish and strongly insist upon their own
opinion. This situation shows the initial phase of planning
a new project, when the plan has just been presented to the
regional inhabitants.
Model 2. Utility independence holds for DM1 and first
order convex independence holds for DM2. The attitude
of DM1 is almost the same as in Model 1, however, DM2
is becoming more flexible towards obtaining consensus
of DM1. In this case DM1 does not have enough infor-
mation on the project, however, DM2 has obtained various
information. This situation corresponds to the second phase
of the consensus formation process.
Model 3. Mutual first order convex independence holds.
The attitude of both DM1 and DM2 is getting more flexi-
ble and cooperative. In this case both DMs have obtained
sufficient information about planning the public project and
the countermeasures for preventing environmental impacts
from the project, and thus, show a mutual concession tak-
ing into account ethical consideration with each other. This
situation corresponds to the final phase of the consensus
formation process between DM1 and DM2.
Suppose the minimum value of group disutility is obtained
for Model 3. This implies that the most impartial consen-
sus formation is obtained under the situation of Model 3,
which is based on convex dependence between two con-
flicting DMs.
As seen from the consensus formation model described
above it may be used as a fundamental material for discus-
sion when the regional inhabitants and the enterpriser of
a public project regulate and adjust their opinion of each
other.
4. Concluding remarks
By using a group disutility function for two conflicting
agents, we could model the mutual concessions of the two
conflicting agents taking into account ethical preference of
each decision maker. We believe that the group disutility
function proposed in this paper is the first mathematical
model that can handle ethical preference of conflicting de-
cision makers with each other. The key idea of this math-
ematical model is that the two-attribute group disutility
function is a function of single-attribute normalized con-
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ditional group disutility function of each decision maker.
Ethical preference of each decision maker is described in
this NCGDF.
The consensus formation model described in this paper is
expected to be used as a fundamental material for discus-
sion when the enterpriser of a public project and the re-
gional inhabitants regulate and adjust their opinion with
other for realizing better social welfare.
References
[1] R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Pref-
erences and Value Tradeoffs. 1993 (originally publised New York:
Wiley, 1976).
[2] H. Tamura and Y. Nakamura, “Decompositions of multiattribute util-
ity functions based on convex dependence”, Oper. Res., vol. 31, no. 3,
pp. 488–506.
[3] A. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1979.
[4] H. Tamura and T. Yoshikawa, Eds., Large-Scale Systems Control and
Decision Making. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1990.
Hiroyuki Tamura
e-mail: tamura@sys.es.osaka-u.ac.jp
Department of Systems and Human Science
Graduate School of Engineering Science
Osaka University
1-3 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka
Osaka 560-8531, Japan
39
